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Pandemic Influenza
School Closure
Policies
To the Editor: Holmberg et al. (1)
are rightly concerned that state pan-
demic plans in the United States rep-
resent a patchwork without central
coordination or direction. These con-
cerns are particularly relevant for
school closure decisions during an
influenza pandemic. The US
Department of Health and Human
Services’ checklist regarding school
closures gives conflicting messages
(2). For example, it recommends that
schools stay open during a pandemic
and develop school-based surveil-
lance systems for absenteeism of stu-
dents and sick-leave policies for staff
and students. It also recommends
developing alternate procedures to
ensure the continuity of instruction in
the event of district-wide school clo-
sures. These vague recommendations
may reflect the paucity of data to rec-
ommend school closure. 
To assess the current status of
school closure decisions in the United
States, I conducted an internet survey
of all 50 state health commissioners
during the spring of 2006. I asked the
respondents 2 questions: “Who makes
the school closure decisions in your
state?” and “What absenteeism rate, if
any, would prompt a school in your
state to close during a typical influen-
za year and/or during a pandemic
influenza year?” Of the 44 responding
states, I found that school closure
decisions were primarily a local-level
responsibility in half. Of these 22
states, closure decisions would be
made either on a school-by-school or
a school district–by–school district
basis. Only 6 states indicated that
school closure decisions would be
made at the state level, and 16 states
would have decisions made jointly at
the state and local levels (Table).
For a typical influenza season,
only 6 states indicated that they close
schools if a certain absenteeism rate
due to illness were reached. For 5 of
these states, the absenteeism rates
ranged from 10% to 30%; the sixth
state said its schools would close if
the rates were anywhere from 7% to
31%. However, only 1 state reported a
threshold absenteeism rate for closure
during an influenza pandemic.
Another state said that it was develop-
ing an absenteeism rate that would
prompt closure for pandemic influen-
za. Forty-two states did not have
threshold absenteeism rates that
would prompt school closures during
an influenza pandemic.
In July 2006, the Department for
Education and Skills in the United
Kingdom published guidelines
regarding school closure (D.
O’Gorman, pers. comm.). Although
the final decision for school closure
would lie with local school officials,
the national government might advise
all schools and childcare facilities to
close when a pandemic reached their
area to reduce the spread of infection
among children (3).It is believed that
all would comply with closure advice
and that use of emergency powers
under the UK Civil Contingency Act
2004 to require services to close
would not be necessary. If all British
schools in an area were advised to
close during a pandemic, the situation
would be reviewed after a period of
time, such as 2 to 3 weeks, by local
officials acting on information from
the UK government, to decide
whether to remain closed.
Although the United States is a
nation dedicated to federalism, an
uncoordinated approach for commu-
nity response measures such as school
closure decisions could jeopardize our
efforts in containing a deadly pan-
demic. If schools were to remain open
until a certain percentage of students
and faculty became ill, as they do dur-
ing typical influenza seasons, then
control measures to contain the out-
breaks would likely be far more diffi-
cult to achieve because a chain of
transmission would be established.
Some might consider it unethical for
schools to stay open in the face of a
pandemic with a high death rate. I
therefore think a national policy, or at
least specific national guidelines,
should be developed jointly by the
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and the Department of
Education, so that states’ school dis-
tricts can develop rational, coherent,
and coordinated closure plans to pro-
tect children and communities during
an influenza pandemic.
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Symptomatic
Human Hantavirus
in the Americas
To the Editor: In a recent letter
(1), dos Santos et al. described 3 cases
of hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
(HPS) from Juquitiba and stated that
“the first human cases of symptomatic
infection by hantaviruses were report-
ed from Brazil in 1993.” However, we
described 8 cases of symptomatic
hemorrhagic fever with renal syn-
drome (HFRS) in Recife, Brazil, 5
months before the initial May 1993
report of Sin Nombre virus
(SNV)–induced HPS in the United
States (2). Our report was therefore
the first published account of sympto-
matic hantavirus infections, not just in
Brazil but anywhere in the Americas
(3).
Serum samples from our Brazilian
HFRS cases, collected in 1990, were
screened by an immunofluorescence
assay (IFA) and ELISA for
immunoglobulin G, as were the cur-
rent Brazilian HPS cases (1). Two of
our patients had an increased
immunoglobulin M titer by ELISA
(2). Rat-transmitted Seoul virus
(SEOV) was considered most likely
because this was the only hantavirus
strain showing clear positive results in
IFA(2,3). All the Recife cases in 1990
had reported likely rat contacts and
were initially diagnosed as leptospiro-
sis with acute renal failure and throm-
bocytopenia, clinical hallmarks of
both HFRS and leptospirosis (3). We
also subsequently found evidence of
SEOV infection in 31 (15%) of 201
leptospirosis-suspected acute renal
failure cases from Belém, Brazil, con-
firmed in 1 case with highly specific
neutralization tests (4). Moreover, as
we predicted (3), some of the 133
(41%) of 326 urban cases of acute
renal failure from Salvador, Brazil,
which appeared nonconfirmed for
leptospirosis (5), were later shown to
be caused by SEOV (unpub. data).
Finally, of 379 schoolchildren from
Salvador at high risk for frequent rat
exposure, 13.2% were IFA positive
for the Korean prototype Hantaan
virus (HTNV) but none for the
American SNV (6). Because both
HTNV and its rodent reservoir are
absent from the American biotope,
HTNV seroreactivity should be con-
sidered a cross-reaction to another
related murine antigen; that is to say,
the ratborne SEOV.
Wild rats (Rattus rattus and R.
norvegicus ) are the only Old World
rodents ubiquitous in the New World
and thus a potential source of SEOV
infection in the Americas (3,7).
Moreover, the first hantavirus charac-
terized in South America was SEOV,
isolated as long ago as 1984 from a rat
caught in Belém (7). Furthermore, the
first 3 clinical cases of hantavirus
infection in the United States were
SEOV-induced (Baltimore rat virus)
HFRS cases and not HPS (8).
The clinical syndromes of HFRS
and HPS can appear identical, with
pulmonary edema, shock, and renal
insufficiency with marked proteinuria
and thrombocytopenia (9). Moreover,
worldwide ELISA testing with a sin-
gle antigen such as SNV or Puumala
virus (PUUV) can result in mislead-
ing cross-reactions, since both viruses
are genetically related. Although this
SNV-PUUV cross-reactivity enabled
the first recognition of HPS cases in
the New World 14 years ago, this may
now lead to the wrong clinical diagno-
sis and reinforces the need for specif-
ic tests such as neutralization tests or
reverse transcription–PCR. Although
not as lethal and probably not so fre-
quent as HPS, SEOV-induced HFRS
may still be greatly underestimated in
the Americas, or misdiagnosed as
leptospirosis.
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